Rape and Responsibility by Henderson, Lynne
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law




Indiana University School of Law - Bloomington
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty
Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Articles by Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Henderson, Lynne, "Rape and Responsibility" (1992). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 2518.
http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/2518
 LYNNE HENDERSON*
 RAPE AND RESPONSIBILITY
 It is men who rape and men who collectively have the power to end rape....
 This will only begin to happen when men cease blaming women for rape.1
 I. INTRODUCTION
 I am a "lucky" survivor of a rape committed by a stranger - "lucky",
 because people believed me, a jury convicted the man of raping me,
 and he is still in prison ten years later. I know many women who have
 been raped who were not so fortunate, because they believed the rape
 was their fault, because no one else believed them, because they knew
 their rapist, or because they were married to him and it wasn't a
 crime. We share some things - the anger, the pain, the anguish, the
 fear - and not others; nevertheless, this is what I wished after I was
 raped and still wish: Never again, not for any woman. Rape is evil.
 This article is dedicated to the survivors, in hopes it will help move us
 toward the day when never again is closer to being a reality.
 One of the major concerns of feminists in the United States has been
 the law and social reality of rape,2 and for good reason: the incidence
 of rape in this country is appallingly high, and the threat of rape
 * I am very grateful to Barbara Babcock, Paul Brest, Donald Ehrman, Martha
 Mahoney, Deborah Rhode, Lauren Robel, Pierre Schlag, Morrison Torrey, Robert
 Weisberg, Mimi Wesson, and Robin West for all their suggestions, thoughts, and
 help with the project. I also wish to thank Mrs. Harry T. Ice and the firm of Ice,
 Miller & Donatio for providing funds for the research and computer upon
 which this was written while I was the Harry T. Ice faculty fellow for 1990-91
 at Indiana University School of Law.
 Timothy Benecke, Men on Rape (New York: St. Martin, 1982), pp. 169-70.
 2 Feminists and other scholars have produced a fine and vast literature on rape
 Law and Philosophy 11: 127-178, 1992.
 ) 1992 KluwerAcademic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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 affects the lives and freedoms of most, if not all, American women.
 Although it is beyond argument that this society considers "rape",
 usually defined as nonconsensual and forced sexual intercourse, to be a
 major felony, it is also the case that rape is a crime that is seldom
 punished. All but the most stereotypical case of the rape of an adult
 woman3 provokes controversy: the meaning of the terms "forcible" and
 "nonconsensual" is deeply contested. Even disagreement about the
 harm of rape, whether any rape constitutes the kind of devastating
 extreme experience that substantially alters its victims' lives and keeps
 its potential victims in a state of fear,4 exists. As a result, reducing
 the amount of rape in this culture has proved a daunting task for
 feminists.
 It is the case that feminists have achieved a number of important
 reforms in the law of rape over the last two decades, including the
 enactment of rape shield laws that protect most victims from having
 to endure cross-examination about their sexual histories, statutory
 redefinitions of the offense, and abolition of the resistance requirement
 in many jurisdictions. But despite this massive legal reform, and the
 growing rate of reported rapes in the United States, conviction rates in
 rape cases still remain far lower than rates for other serious felonies.`
 Empirical evidence exists to suggest that many women still do not
 report rapes to authorities, that police "unfound" reported rapes
 because they do not believe the victims,' that district attorneys refuse
 in the last two decades; "classics" in the field include Susan Brownmiller's Against
 Our Will which appeared in 1975.
 3 I am well aware that females of all ages are raped; in this article, however, I
 am primarily assuming a victim over the age of eighteen.
 4 Margaret Gordon & Stephanie Riger, The Female Fear (New York: Free Press,
 1988).
 5 Gary LaFree, Rape and Criminal Justice: The Social Construction of Sexual Assault
 (Belmont, Ca.: Wadsworth, 1989), pp. 59-60.
 ' Id. at 66-69. See also Homey & Spohn, 'Rape Law Reform and Instrumental
 Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions', Law & Society Review 25 (1991): 117. In 1990,
 an investigative story in the San Francisco Examiner reported that the police in
 Oakland, California, arbitrarily "unfounded" numerous rape complaints; the story
 led to reinvestigation of a number of cases. The reinvestigation indicated that at
 least 79 of 112 rapes did occur and others might very well have. 'Prosecution
 128
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 to prosecute many rapes,7 and that juries fail to convict rapists.8
 Judicial attitudes to rape victims remains skeptical as well in many
 instances.9 Resistance to taking rape seriously takes other forms as well:
 Many judicial opinions and legal textbooks still use the term "pro-
 secutrix" for victims in rape cases, underlining the notion that this is a
 "private" offense, not a state crime: legal materials do not refer to
 female victims of other major felonies as "the prosecutrix". The
 implication of this special term is that it is the woman and not the
 state who bears the burden of proving that she was raped beyond a
 reasonable doubt. And in the academic legal community, attitudes are
 still such that it is possible for the editors of a recent leading criminal
 law casebook to quote a politically conservative British woman author's
 1979 assertion that rape is a very terrible crime - but apparently not
 so terrible that it differs in kind from "having one's teeth knocked
 out" - that is committed by a small number of men against a small
 Seen as Unlikely in 228 Rape Cases in Oakland', N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1990,
 p. B10, col. 1. After a three-month investigation of 203 cases, police concluded
 that 184 did in fact happen and only 19 remained "unfounded". 'Oakland Re-
 examines Sexual Assault Cases', The Herald-Times, February 4, 1991, p. A3, col. 1.
 7 Prosecutors are quick to point out their ethical obligation not to prosecute cases
 they do not believe they can prove beyond a reasonable doubt when asked why
 they didn't prosecute a particular rape. Laura Masnerus, 'The Rape Laws Change
 Faster Than Perceptions', N.Y. Times, February 19, 1989, p. E20, cols. 1-6.
 8 Id.; Rape and Criminal Justice, supra note 5, at 207-26. In 1989, a Florida jury
 acquitted a man, because the victim was not wearing underwear, although she
 did not know the man, alleged he had kidnaped her at knifepoint, and another
 victim testified that the same man had raped her in the same manner. The case
 inspired the Florida legislature to amend its rape shield law to preclude intro-
 duction of evidence of how the victim was dressed "for the purpose of showing
 that the manner of dress ... incited the sexual battery". Fla. Stat. Ann. sec.
 794.022(3) (West Supp. 1991). The evidence of course can come in for other
 reasons, however, and the message that the victim was "provocatively dressed" is
 not likely to escape the jury's attention, even if an attorney can't make the
 argument explicit.
 9 Rape and Criminal Justice, supra note 5, at 91-96. Susan Estrich's 'Rape', Yale
 LJ. 95 (1986): 1087, contains numerous excerpts from appellate decisions,
 including relatively recent ones, demonstrating the attitude of many - although
 certainly not all - appellate judges.
 129
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 number of women.'1 Although the authors go on to note that "women's
 groups" and "feminists" dispute such assertions, there is no hint of the
 extensive empirical data that contradicts the claim," nor is there even
 an acknowledgment of cultural difference in crime rates between the
 U.K. and the U.S. The puzzle of continuing resistance to taking rape
 seriously is the subject of my article.
 In this article, I want to consider those things that I believe serve as
 an impediment to the elimination of sexual violence against women:
 first, a cultural story of heterosexuality that manifests itself in the law
 of rape, and second, the difficulties with, and consequences of, chal-
 lenging and changing that story by using the criminal law. I argue that
 a primary impediment to recognition that rape is a real and frequent
 crime is a widely accepted cultural "story" of heterosexuality that
 results in an unspoken "rule" of male innocence and female guilt in
 law.12 By "male innocence and female guilt", I mean an unexamined
 "' Stanford Kadish & Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes (Boston:
 Little, Brown, 1989), pp. 365-67.
 ' The Uniform Crime Report is generally considered the most conservative
 documentation of crime rates, as it deals only with those crimes that are reported
 to police. Even according to this conservative measure, the rate of rape in the
 United States seems high and has continued to grow substantially. As of 1980,
 the national average for the rate of rape in the fifty states according to the FBI's
 Uniform Crime Report was 36.4 per 100,000. Larry Barron & Murray Strauss,
 Four Theories of Rape in American Society 45 (1989). The number of rapes known to
 the police in the United States increased 440% between 1960 and 1987, a larger
 increase than that for any other violent crime. Id. at 3. "In 1986 there were
 90,434 forcible rapes reported by police across the country to the FBI, represent-
 ing ... a rate of 73 per 100,000 women." The Female Fear, supra note 4, at 33.
 Census Bureau surveyors in 1979 received reports of 192,000 rapes. Id. at 35.
 12 The innocence/guilt theme was suggested both by my consideration of
 cultural beliefs about women and by recent debates about affirmative action and
 race. Tom Ross's formulation of "white innocence and black abstraction" was
 especially helpful. See Ross, 'The Rhetorical Tapestry of Race: White Innocence
 and Black Abstraction', William & Mary Law Review 32 (1990): 1. For an article
 that notes that sympathy lies with the rapist, because male aggression and female
 reluctance are natural and innocent, but that does not develop the story of
 heterosexuality I develop here, see Lois Pineau, Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis, L.
 & Phil. 8 (1989): 217. For a discussion of defense lawyers' invocation of the
 130
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 belief that men are not morally responsible for their heterosexual
 conduct, while females are morally responsible both for their conduct
 and for the conduct of males. Indeed, men are entitled to act on their
 sexual passions, which are viewed as difficult and sometimes impos-
 sible to control; this belief also says that women should know this and
 avoid stimulating them if they do not wish to have sexual intercourse.
 Also, if men feel sexual desire, they are entitled to fulfillment of their
 "needs" through heterosexual intercourse. The flip side of the belief in
 men's inability to control themselves is the attribution of uncontrolled
 sexual passion and lust to women; it is against that lust that men must
 protect themselves, but if they do not, it is again not their responsi-
 bility, but the fault of women. On this view, women's passion and
 lustfulness mean that they are always already consenting to sexual
 activity. Women are seductive and have the power, like the Sirens, to
 drive men "wild", to lose control, and therefore not to be responsible.
 The male innocence/female guilt story is inapplicable only in the case
 of heterosexual relations and rape involving black men and white
 women, where the story is reversed: the theme in this context becomes
 male guilt and female innocence both in law and in culture. But
 otherwise, the defining story for interpreting rape in law and fact is
 that of male innocence/female guilt.
 Thus far, feminists have not successfully challenged this male
 innocence/female guilt story of heterosexuality in our culture, which
 enables men to rape without being held responsible for their acts. To
 counteract the story, some feminists have argued that rape is a crime
 of violence like aggravated assault, which has nothing to do with
 heterosexuality and sexual pleasure. The radical discontinuity of vio-
 lence and sex present in this argument leaves unanswered the messages
 and beliefs about sex that pervade the culture as well as leaving the
 male understanding of violence unchallenged until recently. Other
 feminists have argued that rape is a crime of sex, either because men's
 female guilt story in the context of the New Bedford rape trial, see Kristin
 Bumiller, 'Fallen Angels: The Representation of Violence Against Women in
 Legal Culture', in Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen (eds),
 At the Boundaries of Law (New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1991).
 131
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 heterosexual behavior is violent and dominating or because rape is a
 crime against women as a sex/gender. This radical feminist argument
 that rape is a crime of sex, not violence, has rested in large part on an
 assertion that much heterosexual intercourse is violent and exploitive,
 making it indistinguishable from rape. This radical feminist critique of
 sexual aggression thus denies women's pleasurable experiences of
 heterosexual relations, appearing at times to embody a kind of Victorian
 condemnation of heterosexuality, and simplistically turns the story of
 heterosexuality into one of female innocence (victimization) and male
 blame. Neither characterization therefore successfully challenges the
 status quo. In order to challenge the story successfully, feminists must
 develop a positive story of heterosexuality that will distinguish rape
 from sex from a woman's point of view. Such a story, I believe, can be
 used to rebut the tenacious belief in male innocence/female guilt and
 help encourage mutual responsibility for heterosexual behavior.
 II. THE STORY OF MALE INNOCENCE AND FEMALE GUILT
 "Law" defines the crime of "rape", but so does "culture". The two
 reciprocally influence understandings of what is and is not the crime
 of rape. Criminal law's prohibition of rape operates within a context of
 numerous related phenomena - pornography, gender inequality, social
 disorganization, acceptable violence, messages about "sex" and sexu-
 ality, sexual practices, and individual experiences of sex, intimacy, and
 rape. Rape is confounded with heterosexuality at every juncture, and
 since the dominant cultural message is that heterosexual intercourse is
 good, normal, and pleasurable, the thought that it can be a crime in all
 but the most extreme and stereotypical case is impossible. The cultural
 stereotypes of rape are that rape is either committed by psychopathic
 armed strangers or by black men, by definition, "strangers" if they rape
 white woman. In stereotypical instances, the woman is "innocent" -
 sober, dressed demurely, and chaste. While concerns about "victim
 precipitation" and "blame" may arise even in stereotypical rapes, most
 members of this culture will understand these assaults as rapes, par-
 ticularly if there is visible external injury to the victim. This stereotype
 of rape, while occurring relatively rarely, arguably serves several func-
 132
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 tions: It enables many men who have forced their partners to have sex
 to distinguish their actions from those of "a rapist"; its threatening
 horror maintains control over many women's freedom and activity; it
 allows most men who do commit the crime of rape to go unpunished;
 and it prevents many women who are raped by men they know from
 complaining to authorities or seeking counseling, because they fail to
 meet the societal standard for what it means to have been raped.
 Feminists have not ignored the problem of the culture's stereotypes;
 they have worked hard to overcome them and corresponding irra-
 tional beliefs about rape. Because most women are raped by someone
 who isn't a complete stranger, feminists started using the terms
 "acquaintance rape", "date rape", and "marital rape" to persuade that
 rape does occur in these contexts. These rapes can be just as inten-
 tional, violent, and traumatic to their victims as stranger-in-the-bushes
 rapes, but many still do not believe that intercourse in these contexts
 is rape, because stories we tell about heterosexuality influence the
 interpretation of whether heterosexual penetration is "sex" or "rape".
 Feminists agree that whatever the story of heterosexuality is in rape
 cases, the story is male-, not female-, identified, and that the inter-
 pretation of rape law has been male, not female. For example, Estrich
 has argued that male courts use male understandings of force and
 resistance in interpreting whether a rape occurred or not.'3 Mac-
 Kinnon argues that rape is interpreted through the lens of approved
 male sexual violence toward women; the norm of sexual expression is
 dominating, aggressive, and acquisitive, derived from the images and
 stories of pornography.'4 I do not dispute that pornographic images
 and words form the textual basis of sexuality for some men and
 certainly have affected others, but I would argue that pornography's
 story of heterosexuality is a manifestation of other stories, including a
 story of male innocence and female guilt. And in rape law, the male
 innocence/female guilt story is the one that prevails.
 13 'Rape', supra note 9.
 14 Catharine MacKinnon, Towards a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge:
 Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 180-83, 194-214.
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 Foucault's work on human sexuality argued that sexuality became a
 "discourse" - a system of language and meaning - and a social
 construct as opposed to an activity of unmediated pleasure. It is
 unlikely that human "sex" has existed independent of some form of
 cultural construct for most of human history, but that sexuality is not
 an independent, pure, unmediated phenomenon at present is hardly a
 startling claim. "Sex" itself does not exist apart from assumptions about
 gender roles, morality, or culture; the construction of heterosexual
 relations in this country is a complex of institutions and beliefs,
 including religion, medicine, philosophy, law, economics, and history,
 all of which embody certain attitudes toward women. These constructs
 in turn create stories or narratives about sexuality and its meaning.
 A number of social institutions and disciplines, including religion,
 philosophy, and law, have supported a deeply embedded cultural story
 of male innocence and female guilt in heterosexual relations.'5 For
 example, the so-called Judeo-Christian tradition of Western culture
 developed a theme of sexual temptation of men by women and con-
 demned that temptation as sin. In Eunuchsfor the Kingdom of Heaven,'
 Ranke-Heinemann's historical examination of the Roman Catholic
 Church's theology of women and sexuality, several themes of male
 innocence and female guilt emerge. Although the Church considered
 (and considers) all sex sinful in any context outside marriage and most
 sex sinful if not engaged in for procreative purposes, women still end
 up being more guilty than men in the story.
 For Augustine, the story of Eve's temptation of Adam became a
 condemnation of sex as original sin; the belief that sex is the product/
 manifestation of original sin remains today.17 Albert the Great declared
 that "Eve ... had left all women a double and triple 'woe' . . . first the
 '1 I am not concerned to explain why these stories developed so much as I am
 concerned to argue that they developed and persist. I would think that the
 reasons for and functions of the male innocence female guilt stories vary in
 historical time periods.
 "' Uta Ranke-Heinemann, Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven (Peter Heinegg,
 trans., New York: Doubleday, 1990).
 17 Id., passim.
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 woe of the temptation to concupiscence, second the woe of depravity
 in the sexual act, and third, the woe of excessive lust in conception.
 ..."18 Aquinas believed firmly that women were inferior, "more
 inclined to incontinence" than men; further, sexual pleasure destroyed
 men's reason and control.19 If men lost their reason in the face of
 sexual temptation, it was because of women's moral fault.20 And in an
 early version of "no means yes", St. Albert had noted "'As I heard in
 the confessional in Cologne, delicate wooers seduce women with
 careful touches. The more these women seem to reject them, the more
 they really long for them and resolve to consent to them. But in order
 to appear chaste, they act as if they disapprove of such things'". As
 Ranke-Heinemann observes, "[t]his is an old male theory, now given
 the blessing of St. Albert: The more a woman resists, the more she
 wants it".21
 Although its doctrines emphasize absolute celibacy as the highest
 good, the Church has supported male sex rights over females in the
 context of marriage: wives have a duty to submit to intercourse with
 their husbands to prevent them from committing the sin of adultery
 or fornication, while husbands have no such duty to their wives.22
 More recently, the notion of uncontrollable male sexual desire
 prompted by female temptation has been used as a justification to
 deny use of contraception to women who would otherwise be unpro-
 tected from the "animalistic desires of their husbands",23 apparently
 because the fear of pregnancy and more children would no longer
 deter men or give women a reason to say no. That the argument is
 incoherent does not negate its effective message that women are the
 situs of sexual temptation and sin. Such beliefs about sexual dynamics
 certainly are not confined to Roman Catholic theology; Protestants too
 have been taught to blame Eve, the temptress, for the Fall, to ascribe
 18 Id. at 180.
 19 Id. 188-92.
 20 Id. 119-36.
 21 d. at 179.
 22 Id.
 23 Id. 280-85.
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 lust to women, and to believe that men "lose control" when under the
 influence of sexual passion brought on by a woman.24
 Philosophy's attitude toward women and heterosexuality also rein-
 forced male innocence and female guilt. As Carol Pateman has
 demonstrated, of the Enlightenment philosophers who created the
 theory of the liberal state, Rousseau was the most explicit in arguing
 that women are the source of sexual temptation and irrationality:
 "Women, unlike men, cannot control their 'unlimited desires'....
 Women have only modesty, and if they did not have this constraint,
 'the result would soon be the ruin of both [sexes] . . . Men wouldfinally
 be [women's] victims and would see themselves dragged to death without ever
 being able to defend themselves' "." This "disorder of women" must be
 controlled: "In a letter commenting on reactions to his Politics and the
 Arts, Rousseau says: 'I am not of your opinion when you say that if we
 are corrupted it is not the fault of women, it is our own; my whole
 book is undertaken to show how it is theirfault' ".2,
 Science also tells stories of male innocence and female guilt. His-
 torically, in the early and mid-nineteenth-century United States, for
 example, "a persistent double standard acknowledged men's 'natural'
 lust and their need for sexual gratification".27 Sex was (and is) a
 biological "drive", an "instinct" that requires fulfillment. This "drive" is
 stronger in males than in females; this difference is presently explained
 by differing levels of testosterone. Accordingly, males' stronger sex
 drives "naturally" demand - and entitle them to - "release". Cur-
 rently, the field of sociobiology and its underlying ideology portray
 humans as driven by selfish genes seeking to reproduce themselves,
 24 For example, early Puritan ministers blamed women "for enticing men into
 sexual sin"; later Protestant campaigns for sexual purity blamed women for
 sexual depravity and saw women as a threat to men. John D'Emilio & Estelle B.
 Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America (New York: Harper &
 Row, 1989), pp. 18-19, 142-43.
 25 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
 1988), p. 97.
 26 Id. at 99.
 27 Intimate Matters, supra note 24, at 79. See also Aiken, 'Differentiating Sex from
 Sex: The Male Irresistable Impulse', N.Y.U. Review of Law & Social Change 12
 (1984): 357, 375-79.
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 making it desirable - and "innocent" - for men to have sexual inter-
 course with as many females as they can. Women, on the other hand,
 selectively choose sexual partners (and are thereby guilty of frustrating
 males whom they reject) in their effort to maximize the genetic
 success of their few eggs. Not only is male promiscuity "natural", but
 so is rape, redefined as "nothing more sinister than males' efforts to
 spread their genes around".28 Only men who do not have available
 sexual partners will rape, a "natural", not "blameworthy", phenome-
 non. And, now that females can control their (re)production with birth
 control, the way to avoid rape is to acquiesce in heterosexual inter-
 course; they can have sex with men without running the risk of
 contributing genes to the "wrong" gene pool. In the sociobiology story,
 rather than the woman's temptation driving men to do it, it is men's
 genes, and men can hardly be held responsible for something inevi-
 tably and necessarily biological. Finally, the "science" of psychoanalysis
 also emphasized the stronger sex drive of the male and the "seductive-
 ness" and lesser moral development of the female.
 Certainly there are other cultural and historical stories that do not
 appear to reflect the male innocence/female guilt story. One counter-
 narrative to the male innocence-female blame story is the Victorian
 story of female chastity and uninterest and male predation. This
 counterstory of female innocence and male blame, however, only
 applied in certain contexts of class and race and thus to a narrow
 category of females. Whenever the woman failed to meet societally-
 prescribed standards of reticence and purity, or was of a lower class
 than the man, the story quickly shifted back to male innocence and
 entitlement and female guilt. Middle-class Victorian men, for example,
 were not condemned for having sex with working class women and
 girls; indeed, it was assumed that they would do so to gain sexual
 experience.29 Another counter-story is that of black male guilt and
 28 Ruth Hubbard, "The Political Nature of 'Human Nature'", in Deborah
 Rhode (ed.), Theoretical Perspectives on Sexual Diference (New Haven: Yale Univer-
 sity Press, 1990), pp. 63, 67.
 29 I am relying here on D'Emilio and Freedman's excellent history of sexuality
 in the United States. See, e.g., Intimate Matters, supra note 24 at 70-84, 179-81,
 188-201.
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 white female innocence, growing out of racism: Black male sexuality is
 guilty, dangerous, and predatory and white females are innocent, pure,
 and virtuous. But when the accused is a white man and the victim a
 black woman, the story of male innocence and female guilt recurs
 with a vengeance: The white man has been tempted by the promis-
 cuous, lusty, and sexually omnivorous black woman. And when a
 black man rapes a black woman, either both are guilty or the black
 woman is seen as more culpable, especially if she invokes a white-
 dominated system to prosecute her rapist.30
 Popularized versions of these religious, philosophical, and scientific
 constructs also tell the "men are innocent, women are guilty" story.
 We as a society still see women as responsible for "controlling" hetero-
 sexuality, and blame them when they do not, despite a concomitant
 belief that emphasizes male initiation and persistence in sexual matters.
 In bourgeois culture, in a bizarre distortion of causality, girls are raised
 to believe that their dress, makeup, hairstyle, walk, and talk determine
 male reactions. As Susan Estrich noted in 1985, Ann Landers, the
 popular advice columnist, wrote, "'the woman who 'repairs to some
 private place for a few drinks and a little shared affection' has, by her
 acceptance of such a cozy invitation, given the man reason to believe
 she is a candidate for whatever he might have in mind' .3' Landers
 doesn't seem to have changed her mind in the intervening years,
 despite feminist efforts to combat the ideology of female responsibility
 for rape. Landers published the following letter in 1991:
 Dear Ann Landers: I hope I can put into words my personal theory on date rape
 .... There is no hiding a man's arousal. Usually, the female enjoys bringing it
 30 This certainly appears to be one of the stories that developed during and after
 the Tyson trial. The willingness of blacks and whites of both genders to attack
 the rape survivor for having gone out with Tyson in the early morning and into
 Tyson's hotel room has been troubling, as is the charge of racism in the verdict.
 The survivor, after all, is a black woman. See Kimberle Crenshaw, 'Demarginaliz-
 ing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimi-
 nation Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Policies', U. Chi. L.F. (1989):
 139, 157-60.
 31 Susan Estrich, RealRape (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1987), p. 100.
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 on every bit as much as the man enjoys the experience. It is all part of human
 nature.
 The problem is that for many men, there is only one way to end arousal and
 that is ejaculation. At the height of ecstasy, does the female partner think the
 man is going to excuse himself, go ... and take a cold shower? No way. He wants
 thefinal act.
 ... If the female partner has made up her mind that there is NOT going to
 be penetration, she should put a stop to the proceedings at the very first sign of
 male arousal. A female who doesn't want the total [sic] sexual experience should
 have healthy respect for a flashing red warning light. If she goes beyond this
 point she could be in trouble.
 Here, women control sex, but men lose control, and it is "only
 natural". Males are incapable of being aroused and then going without
 intercourse. Heterosexual contact or play inevitably requires inter-
 course. Men are entitled if women lead them on. Landers seemingly
 approves this vision, responding "I see a great deal of logic in what
 you have said" and ending her commentary with the statement that
 "The female who agrees to hours of petting but does not want to
 complete the sex act is asking for trouble and she will probably get
 it".32 Thus, because women are expected to control sexual activity,
 perversely they become responsible for rape.
 It didn't take long for the term "date rape" to change from a
 description of a context in which rape occurs into an admonishment
 to young women: college administrators, Ann Landers, and the rest of
 the media tell young women that to avoid "date rape" they mustn't
 drink, they must carefully check to see if the man is listening to and
 interested in them, they mustn't go to his room, make out, or do
 anything that might be seen by the male as an invitation to inter-
 course. If they make a "mistake" in judgment and are raped, it
 becomes their fault, not the rapists'. An occasional article will advise
 men that "no means no", that "[i]t's O.K. not to 'score' ", and not to
 assume that "sexy dress [sic] and a flirtatious manner are invitations to
 sex",33 but such advice is relatively rare in the popular press.
 32 Ann Landers, "A male's theory on date rape", San Francisco Examiner, Sunday
 August 4, 1991, p. C-2, cols. 3-4.
 33 Daniel Coleman, "When the Rapist Is Not a Stranger", N.Y. Times, August 29,
 1989, Sec. B, p. Z 1, col. 6.
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 Now, with the availability of reliable birth control and the resulting
 increase in heterosexual intercourse before marriage, heterosexual
 intercourse becomes even more of a male entitlement. Indeed, the
 loosening of sexual mores has seemed to increase opportunities for
 rape and to decrease a woman's power to say "no".34 The determina-
 tion of what is "sexual" continues to rest in what the male defines as
 "sexy"; what a female might think is fashionable, comfortable, or
 pretty gets translated into "provocative clothing" by males and females
 alike in a startlingly "Victorian" move that fits the story of male
 innocence and female blame. Girls and women who flirt (which can
 simply mean being friendly) with men are perceived by men to be
 sexually available. Although men are supposed to seduce, it is women
 who are labelled "seductive", a negative term, and seductive women
 who do not respond to a man's advances are despicable: Women who
 "act sexy" and "don't put out" are "teases", deserving of rape.3
 34 By making this statement, I do not mean to approve of arguments that we
 should go back to the "good old days" of strict control of women's sexuality
 through chaperones, curfews, bans on access to birth control, and so on. Rather, I
 believe the project of freeing women to express their heterosexuality never really
 began.
 35 Ann Scales in a recent law review article quotes at length from a letter to the
 editor of a "hometown newspaper". The letter writer, dutifully acknowledging
 that rape is a terrible crime that affects many women and all, goes on to say:
 If this is true, why do so many women take such foolish chances of being the
 next victim of rape? This past week I was driving through a fairly well-lighted
 part of Winston-Salem. It was 9 p. m., and hardly anyone on the streets.
 As I stopped at a red light, rounding a corner was an attractive young woman,
 I would say in her early 20s, wearing a skin-tight aerobic outfit with bike pants.
 As I watched her run, I became increasingly angry [sic] and wanted to say
 something ...
 I am writing this letter in hopes that the jogger, or someone like her, will
 read it and realize that instead of someone concerned with her well-being, I
 could have been a rapist and she my next victim.
 This man was so concerned that he considered throwing a soda can at the victim.
 As Scales points out, the letter blames "the woman for existing and looking
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 We haven't really moved far from the nineteenth-century belief
 that "men are lustful, they have drives"36 that they have difficulty
 controlling. Women have the power to make men "lose control," and
 if one "loses control", then one is not responsible. Girls and women are
 blamed if they say no "too late", when the boy or man can no longer
 "control" himself. Women also ostensibly have power to use sex as a
 "weapon" against men; weapons, of course, call for a fight, a justified
 one, against women.37 When all else fails, and the young man truly
 does do something stupid, abusive, or harmful, even if it is rape, there
 is still that old fall-back, "boys will be boys".
 If this weren't enough to demonstrate the prevalent cultural dy-
 namic of male innocence and female guilt, the entrenched cultural
 belief that "no means yes" provides another illustration. As the quote
 from St. Albert suggests, the "no means yes" discounting of women's
 expressed interest has been with us for some time. Girls and women
 may be taught to say no, but many boys and men are taught that "no
 means yes". In Pride and Prejudice, Mr. Collins refuses to accept
 Elizabeth Bennett's "no", arguing, "it is usual with young ladies to
 reject the addresses of the man whom they secretly mean to accept,
 when he first applies for their favor; and . . . sometimes the refusal is
 repeated a second or even third time".38 Elizabeth replies, "I do assure
 you I am not one of those young ladies (if such young ladies there are)
 who are so daring as to risk their happiness on the chance of being
 asked a second time. I am perfectly serious in my refusal. . .".39
 Unfortunately, such "young ladies" do exist; women, too, participate
 in disabling themselves by subscribing to the "no means yes" myth. A
 great". It also strongly suggests that women, and not men, are responsible for
 rape because they provoke male lust. See Ann Scales, 'Feminists in the Field of
 Time', U. Fla. L. Rev. 42 (1990): 95, 102.
 36 Intimate Matters, supra note 4 at 173.
 37 For an illuminating analysis of how this works, see George Lakoff, Women,
 Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind (Chicago: Univ.
 of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 412-15.
 38 Jane Austen, Pride and Prejudice (New York: Signet, 1961), p. 94.
 39 Id.
 141
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 27 May 2016 13:56:35 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Lynne Henderson
 female country singer recently recorded a song with the title "Maybe I
 Mean Yes" and lyrics that included the language "When I say 'no' I
 mean 'maybe'/Or maybe I mean 'yes' "40 which she said was meant to
 be a "lighthearted look at one couple's attempt at dating, handled in
 an innocent, nonsexual, flirtatious way".41 Although she agreed to stop
 performing the song and to ask radio stations not to play it, it was not
 without saying, "[it] seems like maybe I'm being used by some angry
 people who need a soapbox to express their views".42 That "no means
 yes" can be perceived as normal and innocent suggests that if women
 do lie, or if "no" does not mean no, as in the song, then men are
 innocent when they ignore the word "no".
 Rape myths also embody the story and reinforce the belief in male
 innocence and female guilt.43 Recent reporting in the press about the
 rape charge in Palm Beach provides a dramatic recent example of the
 power of these myths and stories of male innocence and female guilt.
 Not only did the N.Y. Times publish the accuser's name, contrary to its
 established policy, but also, and more damaging, it published informa-
 tion about her that reinforced rape myths and biases against women
 who don't fit the "proper" definition of "victim".44 She wasn't married,
 she had a child, she came from a working class background, and she
 had been drinking. She was a "party girl" - the article suggested
 strongly that she was "promiscuous". She had bad high school grades
 and a bad driving record. What relevance does this "information" have
 to whether she was raped or not? What possible relevance to truthful-
 40 Chuck Philips, "Country Song Draws Ire of Feminists", L.A. Times, July 26,
 1991, p. F 4, co. 1.
 41 Chuck Philips, "Just Say No to 'Maybe,' Dunn Asks," L.A. Times, July 27,
 1991, p. F1, col. 5.
 42 "Country Song Draws Ire of Feminists", supra note 40, at F 4, col. 1.
 43 See generally Against Our Will, supra note 2; see also Morrison Torrey, 'When
 Will We Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecu-
 tions', U.C. Davis L. Rev. 24 (1991): 1013, 1071.
 44 Fox Butterfield & Mary B. Tabor, 'Leap Up Social Ladder for Woman in
 Rape Inquiry', N.Y. Times April 17, 1991, Y A9, cols. 1-6; Susan Estrich, 'The
 Real Palm Beach Story', N.Y. Times, April 18, 1991, Y A15, cols. 2-4. See Rape
 and CriminalJustice, supra note 5, at 201.
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 ness do speeding tickets have? Why don't heterosexual male promis-
 cuity and unwed fatherhood count against men? The Times story is
 only relevant if one subscribes to the male innocence/female guilt
 story. Some time later the Times published a brief story on allegations
 about the defendant's prior sexual aggression towards women. But the
 story came to light because of the prosecution's diligence and the
 willingness of the other women to speak out, not because of any Times
 investigation into the man's history. After the prior incidents became
 public knowledge, the press was anxious to preserve the presumption
 of innocence and expressed great concern that the defendant would
 not get a "fair trial". The press's subsequent fretting about the fairness
 of admitting evidence of prior incidents - a common enough occur-
 rence in major felony cases to prove "m.o." - was unusual. And the
 press generally manifested no such concern with the victim receiving a
 fair hearing at any time, although papers did publish letters to the
 editor expressing this concern.
 Male innocence/female guilt is obviously not the only available
 cultural story of heterosexuality. There is a religious or "moral" story
 that any form of sexual relations outside of marriage and for non-
 procreative purposes are criminal and sinful. There is a "traditional"
 story of sexual relations that holds sex must only exist inside marriage,
 and that its goal is not only to produce children but also to cement
 the bond of love and intimacy of the partners. There is a "liberal"
 story that the context of sexual relations doesn't matter as long as they
 are "consensual" in a thin sense of the word "consent"45 that fails to
 take into account women's subordinated status and assumes that
 women have equal power to act autonomously in sexual relations.
 There is a pornographic story of dominance and submission, including
 the "bodice ripper" story of being "swept away" and "overcome" with
 passion, and a story of danger, violence, and eroticism. There are
 romantic stories of "magic" and love; there are stories of sexuality as
 an expression of love, care, and respect for one another and mutuality
 45 Martha Chamallas, 'Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual
 Conduct', So. Cal. L. Rev. 61 (1988): 777, 790-95.
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 of desire and responsibility. And of course there is the "sex difference"
 story that men have sex for physical pleasure and women have sex for
 love and affection.46 None of these stories immediately raises images of
 male innocence and female guilt, but they are not necessarily incon-
 sistent with the innocence/guilt theme, either. For example, the "reli-
 gious" story is often tied to the temptation of Adam by Eve, the Fall,
 and the role of woman as destructive of male morality. The "tradi-
 tional" story tends to work on the double standard, excusing men's
 sexual behavior outside of marriage and condemning women's be-
 havior; within marriage, men's sexual behavior is always innocent,
 because they are entitled to sex from their wives. The pornographic
 stories reinforce beliefs that men are entitled to force women to
 submit, because women really find violence pleasurable and want it.
 It is also true that many men do not believe in or act upon the
 story of male innocence and female blame. Many men respect women,
 experience sexual arousal without insisting that arousal entitles them
 or inexorably impels them to intercourse, and do not project their
 own sexual desires onto women. Many men feel vulnerable and
 anxious about sex and would not dream of imposing themselves on a
 woman in the name of virility; they would refuse to blame the woman
 for "manipulating" them. Many others respect a "no", even if they may
 feel confused about its meaning; some are capable of empathizing with
 their partners and taking responsibility to ensure she is willing. What
 is strange is that so many of these men - as lawyers, judges, and
 legislators - appear by their acts and rhetoric to support the right of
 other men to claim entitlement, loss of control, and powerlessness and
 to attribute to women all the responsibility for rape. It is to the
 interpretation of the law of rape that I now turn.
 III. THE STORY IN RAPE LAW
 The story of male non-responsibility and female blame appears to be
 the dominant story in the law of rape. A historical study of rape
 prosecutions in New York City between 1790 and 1820 indicates that
 46 Intimate Matters, supra note 4 at 262-74.
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 the male innocence/female guilt paradigm existed then: Women had
 strong sexual urges that meant they were always willing and often
 manipulated men.47 "The gregarious lives of New York's laboring
 women . . . seem to have provided some men with, in effect, entitle-
 ment to women's bodies."48 There is evidence that "no means yes" was
 common: Defense counsel in one case argued, "Any woman who is
 not an abandoned Prostitute will appear to be averse to what she
 inwardly desires; a virtuous girl on the point of yielding will not
 appear to give a willing consent ...". Women who were "assertive,
 gregarious, [and] sexually tough" were asking for it and consenting.49
 "[O]nly a particular sort of rape case was capable of bringing a guilty
 verdict" - the cases in which the "circumstances of the crime resem-
 bled a scenario of male villainy and female helplessness".5?
 Today, for the most part, particularly in statutory law, examples of
 male innocence/female guilt tend to be less obvious than they were in
 the "good old days", when to prove they were raped women had to
 "resist to the utmost" and when juries were told routinely that the
 testimony of the victim was to be viewed with caution, rape being "an
 accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be
 defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent".51 Although the
 law on the books no longer overtly embodies these themes, police
 officers, prosecutors, judges, and jurors still resist the notion that men
 acquainted with the victim commit rape, particularly when the victim
 has been drinking, is wearing certain clothing (known as "provocative"
 clothing), is sexually experienced, or has consented to sex with the
 man in the past. Although rape law reform has helped some, the
 victim is still the one who is scrutinized and on trial in most cases that
 47 Marybeth Hamilton Arnold, 'The Life of a Citizen in the Hands of a Woman:
 Sexual Assault in New York City, 1790 to 1820', in Kathy Peiss & Christin
 Simmons (eds.), Passion & Power (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1989), p. 35.
 48 d.at 42.
 49 Id. at 48.
 50 Id.
 51 Against Our Will, supra note 2 at 413; see also People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14
 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
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 get that far. In all but the most stereotypical rape case, but unlike the
 usual criminal prosecution, the defendant is presumed innocent; it is
 the victim who is presumed to be culpable in some way.
 A striking example of the reinterpretation of a rape into the story of
 male innocence and female guilt is Justice Blackmun's opinion in In re
 Michael M., decided in 1981.52 Michael M. is a staple of discussions of
 equal protection law in sex discrimination cases in constitutional law
 texts: The case involved an equal protection challenge to the Cali-
 fornia statutory rape law that makes it a crime to have sexual relations
 with minor females but not minor males. No matter how many times
 I read the opinions, both in the United States and California Supreme
 Courts, I still find them slightly nutty; all of the Justices who con-
 sidered the case seemed to experience some form of thought disorder
 on the issue of sex. The origins of, and the legislative intent in enact-
 ing, statutory rape laws were in protecting female chastity and there-
 fore a female's value as marriageable property. Given the U.S. Supreme
 Court's rejection of "stereotypes" in sex discrimination cases, this
 reason for statutory rape laws punishing males and not females might
 have been held unconstitutional. Yet both courts held that the state's
 post hoc justification of "preventing teenage pregnancy" - a rationale
 for which there was no evidence in the legislative history - was a
 constitutionally permissible reason to make having intercourse with
 underage females but not males a felony.
 Michael M. has been the subject of much feminist criticism,
 although little of that criticism is based on the fact that the case
 involved an actual rape.53 Yet it is the interpretation of the story of the
 rape in Michael M. by Justice Blackmun - a judge who has often
 shown a considerable and nuanced understanding of and sensitivity to
 52 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
 53 If mentioned at all, the actual rape is mentioned in passing. See, e.g., Frances
 Olsen, 'Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis', Texas L. Rev. 63
 (1984): 387; Nancy S. Erikson, Final Report: 'Sex Bias in the Teaching of
 Criminal Law', Rutgers L. Rev. 42 (1990): 309, 394 ("Additionally, the specific
 facts in Michael M., which indicate [sic] that the young woman did not willingly
 consent to intercourse, but was coerced, can be used to call attention to prosecu-
 torial discretion. .").
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 women and sexuality in his opinions54 - that illustrates how the male
 innocence/female guilt interpretation of a violent sexual encounter
 works. Blackmun's puzzling (and unnecessary) concurring opinion
 includes a footnote with an extended excerpt from the victim's testi-
 mony at the preliminary hearing. The victim testified that she met the
 defendant and his friends at night at a bus stop, drank with him, and
 started kissing him. She then asked him to "stop" and to "slow down";
 then she walked with him to a park bench where she again kissed
 him. But when he told her to take off her pants, she said no. After she
 refused, the defendant "slugged" her in the chin two or three times
 with his fist, bruising her face. He took her pants off; she testified she
 "let him do what he wanted to do".55
 Blackmun's opinion does not assert that the victim's story is not
 true; rather, he reinterprets it in a way to make what looks like force
 and nonconsent into a case of male innocence and female responsibility.
 Although Blackmun notes that the two were not even acquainted
 before that night, he characterizes the victim as the defendant's "part-
 ner", who "appear[ed] not to have been an unwilling participant in at
 least the initial stages of the intimacies . . . their drinking, their with-
 drawal from the others of the group; their foreplay, in which she
 willingly participated and seems to have encouraged ... are factors that
 should make this case an unattractive one to prosecute at all, and
 especially to prosecute as a felony ...".56 This is not a forcible rape,
 despite the fact that the defendant hit the victim in the chin - force
 - and ignored her no - nonconsent. Blackmun's point of view is that
 she asked for it; it transforms what we called "making out" when I was
 a teenager into "foreplay", and, as we all know, "foreplay" is the term
 for what you do before you have heterosexual intercourse. Apparently
 slugging someone in the face is part of the "intimacies" of "foreplay".
 She led him on ("encouraged" him), she issued an invitation to inter-
 54 See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American Coll. of Obstetricians 476 U.S. 747 (1986)
 (abortion); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (dissenting opinion; homo-
 sexual sodomy).
 55 450 U.S. at 483-85.
 56 Id. at 483-86 (emphasis supplied).
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 course by agreeing to foreplay, she said no too late - she'd led him on
 - and not late enough - she "let him do what he wanted".
 Michael M. is not the same as the prototypical stranger-in-the-
 bushes rape, completely discontinuous with what "normal" hetero-
 sexual men understand "sex", rather than "rape", to be. But to a
 woman, the victim's testimony might read as very continuous with the
 stranger-in-the-bushes rape: It becomes rape when she said no, or
 when she said no and he hit her, pushed her down, took off her
 clothes, and she gave up ("submitted").
 None of the opinions suggests that Michael M. might have been
 guilty of rape, perhaps because of the existing law. At the time of the
 crime, California had a statutory resistance requirement and saying no
 wasn't resistance, although slugging a woman in the face was probably
 enough force and might have been enough to "vitiate" consent. An-
 other possible explanation for why Michael M. was not prosecuted for
 rape exists as well: the case was, and would be today, a "consent
 defense" case, which even sympathetic prosecutors don't like, because
 these cases are often the ones they lose. Prosecutors lose consent
 defense cases because of the story of male innocence and female guilt
 that entitles men to intercourse when a woman is "asking for it" or
 tempting him. Pragmatically, then, Michael M. was not worth prosecut-
 ing as a rape, although the prosecutor believed strongly enough in the
 existence of a crime to charge the defendant with statutory rape, a
 crime in which "consent" is not an issue.
 IV. FEMINISTS AND THE LAW OF RAPE
 Any proposed change in the legal standard will raise lots of questions, of course.
 But what many women find frustrating about discussions of the issue [of rape] is
 that it is virtually impossible to get men to focus for more than 30 seconds on
 "our" definition of the problem - the pandemic of violence against women that
 is sanctioned by state action and inaction under the criminal law - before
 turning the conversation to concerns about wrongful prosecution. I yield to no
 one in my commitment to due process. I just wish more men were equally
 committed to doing something about sexual violence.57
 7 Confidential memo (copy on file with author).
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 Beginning in the 1970s, feminists sought to have the crime of rape
 taken seriously by courts, legislatures, and the society as a whole.
 Feminists concerned to have the criminal law reflect the seriousness of
 rape have thus far used a number of strategies to undermine the
 presumption of male innocence and female guilt, primarily by concen-
 trating on eliminating legal manifestations of the belief in female guilt.
 Pointing to the overt sexism and misogyny in case law and statutes,
 feminists lobbied and litigated for reform in the law of rape. And,
 often in alliance with sympathetic men and crime control advocates,
 feminists achieved a number of legal reforms. States enacted laws
 forbidding general cross-examination of victims about their sexual
 behavior, which work more or less well in protecting these crime
 victims from unnecessary invasion and intrusion. The "prompt com-
 plaint" and "corroboration" requirements, still present in the Model
 Penal Code, disappeared from the statutes if not in fact. A number of
 legislatures and courts abolished the "resistance" requirement; others
 abolished the so-called "marital exemption". Trial courts stopped
 instructing juries to view the victim's testimony with caution because
 "rape is a charge easily made and difficult to disprove". Several state
 legislatures, concluding that if intercourse is forced, it isn't consensual,
 dropped the non-consent requirement from their statutory definitions;
 other states dropped the force requirement and focused on non-
 consent. Despite these changes in the law-on-the-books, however, rape
 victims continue to be tried and found wanting and rapists are still
 seen as innocent of any wrongdoing.
 To counteract the belief in female guilt, feminists have often
 advocated the use of expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome in
 rape prosecutions.58 "Rape trauma syndrome" describes the aftereffects
 of the extreme trauma of rape and the associated, secondary harms
 rape survivors suffer. Feminists reasoned that evidence of the presence
 of rape trauma syndrome, a specific kind of post-traumatic stress
 disorder, is particularly relevant to the issue of consent: Women who
 58 See generally Toni Massaro, 'Experts, Psychology, Credibility, and Rape: The
 Rape Trauma Syndrome Issue and Its Implications for Expert Psychological
 Testimony', Minn. L. Rev. 69 (1985): 395.
 149
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 27 May 2016 13:56:35 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Lynne Henderson
 engage in consensual heterosexual activity do not suffer severe trauma
 as a result; therefore if trauma is present, it wasn't "sex". Feminists also
 saw evidence of rape trauma syndrome as a means to eliminate
 skepticism about a rape victim's credibility and to dispel rape myths.
 In the process of explaining the syndrome, the expert witness can
 explain that rape is not enjoyable and create a context for understand-
 ing the survivor's behavior outside the standard rape myths, while
 lending credibility to her claim that she was raped. But rape trauma
 syndrome evidence has not yet appeared to have had much success in
 court, although it may be helpful in convincing law enforcement
 officials that a rape actually occurred. Many courts do not admit
 expert testimony on rape trauma, and others have used its admissi-
 bility to require examinations by defense psychiatrists, a regular and
 degrading occurrence before the original feminist rape reform efforts
 led to abolition of automatic psychiatric exams.59 Even when courts
 allow rape trauma syndrome testimony, it is not an unmixed blessing:
 it focuses attention on whether the victim really suffers from it,
 removing focus from the accused; moreover, given the prevalence of
 sexual assault in this culture, even when the victim has all the
 symptoms, they may not be attributable to the event at issue. And
 while rape trauma syndrome evidence may help rebut assumptions of
 female guilt, it does little to address the male innocence side of the
 story.
 In a recent article, Morrison Torrey argues that courts should take
 rape trauma syndrome testimony one step farther and admit expert
 testimony on rape myths in rape trials. Substantial empirical evidence
 exists demonstrating that a large number of people in this culture
 subscribe to rape myths; accordingly, any rape trial is likely to begin
 with a jury - not to mention a judge - biased against the com-
 plainant. To counteract the bias and insure jury impartiality, Torrey
 59 See John Monaghan & Laurens Walker, Social Science and the Law: Cases and
 Materials (Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1989) 410-23; Experts, Psychology,
 Credibility, and Rape, supra note 53 at 453-60; J. Alexander Tanford, 'Law Reform
 by Courts, Legislatures, and Commissions Following Empirical Research on Jury
 Instructions', Law & Society Rev. 25 (1991): 155, 155-57.
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 argues that courts should allow expert testimony on "any rape myth
 implicated in the particular case".60 Such testimony would educate the
 jury that many of the dominant cultural beliefs about rape are false.
 While this testimony can perhaps help undermine the male innocence
 story, whether courts would admit such expert testimony given judi-
 cial reluctance to engage in innovation and skepticism about admitting
 testimony based on social science evidence remains an open question.6'
 Particularly in the interpretations of "consent" to "sex", the law
 continues to protect an irrational and irresponsible model of male
 sexuality, courting behavior, and female sexuality, giving women little
 access to law in protecting themselves against male sexual aggression.
 Whether framed by law as a question of the woman's resistance, the
 defendant's mens rea, or the victim's conduct and credibility, the
 consent defense as it presently exists in the context of ideologies about
 appropriate sexual behavior and the story of male innocence and
 female guilt operates to distort the reality of rape. Justice Blackmun's
 opinion in Michael M. is an example of how easily "consent" can be
 created out of a violent event. At the same time, the presumption
 of women's basic willingness to have heterosexual sex creates what
 Catharine MacKinnon observes, a "line between intercourse and rape
 [that] is so passive that a dead body could satisfy it".62
 A recent example of the "dead body" interpretation of consent
 appears in articles about a New York case of sexual abuse. Three white
 college men were prosecuted for sexually abusing and orally raping a
 Jamaican black woman who was also a student. The victim testified
 that she was repeatedly sodomized after the defendants made her
 drink several vodka-and-orange-soda concoctions that caused her to
 lose consciousness. Unlike most rape and sexual assault cases, where it
 60 See 'When Will We Be Believed?', supra note 43, at 1071. Torrey is particu-
 larly concerned to eliminate the requirement of "prompt complaint" and the
 myth that a woman who did not immediately report a rape is lying.
 61 It seems highly unlikely that such testimony would be admissible in all cases
 in any event.
 62 MacKinnon, 'Reflections on Sex Equality Before the Law', Yale LJ. 100
 (1991): 1281, 1300.
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 is the survivor's word against the defendant's, there were witnesses to
 the event. These witnesses testified "how Walter slapped her hand
 away, Walter shoved her down on the bed and held her there",'3 yet
 the jury acquitted the three defendants. The victim did not report the
 assault to the authorities immediately, although she did tell a nun and
 a coach at the college. The defense attorneys argued she willingly went
 with one of the men to the room where she drank; she engaged in a
 conversation about sex with him before she reached the room in
 which the assault occurred. The defense also argued that she didn't
 resist.64 Two of the defendants argued consent, claiming "that no
 crimes had been committed because the woman consented to what-
 ever sexual activity took place ...".5 Even the prosecutor argued that
 the defendants intended to "seduce", not assault, her, but because she
 passed out, she could no longer "consent".6
 Members of the jury stated they did not believe the prosecution
 witnesses; the foreman said there were "'so many inconsistencies' in
 the victim's testimony" - about how many drinks she had - and the
 testimony of other witnesses - among other things, whether she was
 lying down or sitting up at one point - that there was no crime.'7
 The reason the foreman gave for the trial, given his disbelief that any
 crime had occurred, was "Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned"."8
 And possibly, because of the story of female lust and black female
 promiscuity, the jury concluded that this victim consented to engaging
 63 Kathy Dobie, 'What the Jury Wouldn't See', The Village Voice, Aug. 6, 1991, p.
 27, 31, col. 1.
 A4 Alisa Solomon, "Unreasonable Doubt," The Village Voice, Aug. 6, 1991, p. 25,
 26, col. 3-4.
 6' The third defendant argued mistaken identity. Joseph P. Fried, "3 Acquitted
 of All Charges In St. John's Sex Abuse Case, N.Y. Times, Wed. July 24, 1991, p.
 z-A16, cols. 1 & 2. See also 'What the Jury Wouldn't See', p. 31, col. 1 ("Stephen
 Scaring, Walter's defense attorney, credits his victory to raising doubts in the
 jury's mind about whether the sex was forced.")
 66 'Unreasonable Doubt', supra note 64, at 26 col. 4, 30 col. 3.
 67 Kathy Dobie, "What the Jury Wouldn't See", Village Voice, August 6, 1991, p.
 27, 28, cols. 2-3.
 68 'What theJury Wouldn't See', supra note 67, p. 30, col. 3.
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 in fellatio with a number of men, most of them strangers, having no
 objection to the men "flapping" their penises against her face.69
 Efforts to reform the law governing consent continue. In 1990 in
 California, for example, the legislature redefined "consent" to require
 "positive cooperation . . . pursuant to an exercise of free will ... freely
 and voluntarily given"; further, "a current or previous dating relation-
 ship shall not be sufficient to constitute consent . . .where consent is
 at issue".70 The legislature also amended the definition of rape to
 include "duress", meaning a "direct or implied threat of force, vio-
 lence, danger, hardship, or retribution sufficient to coerce a reasonable
 person of ordinary susceptibilities to perform an act .... The total
 circumstances, including the age of the victim, and his or her relation-
 ship to the defendant, are factors to be considered in appraising the
 existence of duress". "Duress" presumably will negate consent.
 These changes might expand the law-on-the-books to "consent"
 situations that in the past were not considered to be rape. "Consent"
 does not automatically exist in a dating relationship; physical force is
 not the only kind of force that constitutes rape. At the same time, of
 course, the provisions can be interpreted very narrowly to comport
 with stories of male innocence and female guilt. For example, the
 "hardship" and "retribution" language could be interpreted to mean
 physical retaliation or harm, not financial or other forms of harm.
 "Positive cooperation" might include putting a hand on a man's penis
 - perhaps to prevent deep thrusting71 as the victim in New York did
 before one of her attackers slapped her hand away - or as I did when
 I was told to by the man who raped me.
 Other proposed changes in the law regarding consent have included
 Susan Estrich's argument that law focus on the man's mens rea as to
 consent in sexual interactions. She has argued that the mental state of
 negligence as to consent should be sufficient to establish culpability for
 rape - that is, if the man had an unreasonable belief that the woman
 69 "What the Jury Wouldn't See", supra note 67, at p. 30, col. 4.
 70 Cal. Pen. Code s 261.2, 261.6 (West Supp. 1990).
 71 "What the Jury Wouldn't See", supra note 58, at p. 31, col. 1.
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 was consenting and went ahead, he would be guilty of some form of
 rape.72 But as I have suggested elsewhere, focusing on the man's mens
 rea does little to undermine the male innocence/female guilt theme, at
 least if we use a "reasonable man" standard.73 Given the story of
 heterosexuality applicable to rape, a reasonable man is entitled to
 interpret almost every situation to mean he has consent. As a result,
 prosecutors will have difficulty proving beyond a reasonable doubt
 that the man's belief he had consent was not "reasonable" when there
 is not serious violence and injury or a stereotypical rape. In other cases,
 we are again left with the victim's word against the accused's inter-
 pretation within the framework of the story of male innocence and
 female guilt.
 The "no means no" formulation of nonconsent advocated by Estrich
 and many others, on the other hand, does threaten to change the story
 from male innocence to male responsibility: if she says no, then he is
 on notice that she is not consenting and at a minimum is responsible
 for clarifying the situation. If he continues despite the no, he has
 manifested a culpable mental state of recklessness, because he has been
 made aware of the risk that she is not consenting.74 As nice and simple
 as the formulation is, however, confining notice of nonconsent to the
 word no would be mistaken: If the woman does not say no, but an
 equivalent such as the victim's "slow down" and "stop it" without the
 no in Michael M., or if she does not show "positive cooperation", either
 by freezing with fear, crying, screaming, or swearing (as I did), passing
 out if she's been drinking, and so on, he is on equal notice to stop.
 Such a formulation's potential efficacy becomes apparent in the
 reactions to it: I have encountered considerable resistance to my argu-
 ment that a woman's no should create a kind of strict liability and
 there is evidence of similar resistance in the media. What if she's
 giggling and says no? Must he stop? What's the context of the no?
 72 Real Rape, supra note 31, at pp. 97-99; Susan Estrich, 'Rape', Yale LJ. 95
 (1986): 1087.
 73 Henderson, 'What Makes Rape a Crime?', Berkeley Women's L.J. 3 (1987-88):
 193.
 74 Id. at 212-17.
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 What if she's pleading? What if she said it but stopped saying it?
 Worse, a no means no campaign on a campus in Canada caused a
 group of male students "to respond with a 'sign campaign' ", including
 signs that said "'No means tie me up"' and "'No means dyke'".75
 There is at a minimum a "problem of transition"76 with no means no;
 it so deeply challenges the "no means yes" story and, accordingly, the
 male innocence story.
 Lois Pineau suggests one way of dealing with this problem of
 transition from one way of telling the story to another in a thoughtful
 article on date rape: She argues that when a woman says she did not
 consent, the focus should not be on what the man thought, e.g., his
 mens rea, but whether a woman would consent under the circum-
 stances. She stresses a model of "communicative sexuality" that is
 pleasurable, and then argues that it is "what is reasonable from a
 woman's point of view that must provide the principal delineation ...
 of consent that is capable of representing a woman's willing behavior".7
 In arguing for using the criterion of mutual desire to determine
 whether a reasonable woman would consent to sexual intercourse,
 Pineau draws both on research on human sexuality - what she terms
 "sexology" - and women's experiences of heterosexual relations. She
 argues that "if science [sexology] and the voice of women concur, if
 75 Magda Lewis, 'Interrupting Patriarchy: Politics, Resistance, and Transforma-
 tion in the Feminist Classroom', Harv. Educ. Rev. 60 (1990): 467, 467.
 76 The term is Christine Littleton's: "In its most general sense, the problem of
 transition is created by an existing system of power that makes any non-con-
 forming patterns of behavior appear deviant, which in turn makes it relatively
 easy to maintain and increase the differential in the social rewards between
 conformist patterns of behavior and non-conformist ones. . . . The existence of
 such a power structure has two related consequences: By defining the 'terms of
 the debate', or the range of acceptable discourse, it makes challenges that start
 from non-conformist premises appear not only deviant, but often literally
 incomprehensible, and by defining the reward system, it makes non-conformist
 action expendable in both tangible and intangible ways". See Littleton, 'Women's
 Experience and the Problem of Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of
 Women', U. Chi. L.F. 23 (1989): 47.
 77 Pineau, 'Date Rape: A Feminist Analysis', L. & Phil. 8 (1989): 217, 221.
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 aggressive seduction does not lead to good sex, if women do not like it
 or want it, then it is not rational to think that they would agree to it. When
 such sex takes place, it is therefore rational to presume that the sex
 was not consensual".78
 Pineau's "reasonable woman" standard, the admission of rape trauma
 syndrome evidence, and the concern with rape myths all go directly to
 trying to distinguish rape from "sex". Yet the distinction, if any,
 remains unarticulated. It would seem crucial to distinguish the two
 given the cultural confusion embodied in the male innocence/female
 guilt and other stories of sexuality and rape.
 V. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RAPE AND "SEX"
 Opposition to feminist efforts to prevent rape and to expand the
 criminal law's application beyond the stereotypical rape remains tena-
 cious. One difficulty feminists continue to have in trying to persuade
 men that rape is a crime that encompasses far more than the stereo-
 types is that there is no analogous experience for men to sympathize
 with. Some, but very few, men are heterosexually raped; therefore it is
 hard for them to understand the physical pain and terror of forced
 heterosexual intercourse, although they may understand, however
 remotely, the fear of forced anal and oral sex. Intercourse is supposed
 to be pleasurable, sex is supposed to be pleasurable, so where's the
 harm? In an attempt to have men sympathize, one feminist strategy
 has been to argue that rape is a crime of violence. According to this
 argument, rape has nothing to do with sexual passion; it is an act of
 power, anger, or hatred. Rape is an assaultive crime that attacks the
 physical integrity and mind of the victim. Rape is as brutal as any
 vicious, violent attack.
 This rape-as-violence argument did succeed in disentangling rape
 from sex, and therefore harm from pleasure, in the minds of many.
 Until men and women understood that rape is not sexual passion as
 they understand it, it was difficult to obtain any rape law reform. Men
 78 Id. at 232.
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 can understand violence - being punched, being stabbed, being shot -
 as something harmful, frightening, and criminal. The metaphor of
 violence not only erases the image of pleasure but also reinforces
 sympathy for the victim. But while rape is a violent, scary, and aggres-
 sive act, the rape-is-violence argument hasn't succeeded in conveying
 the seriousness of the crime because of the particular understanding
 and image of violence we have.
 The rape-as-violence argument leaves unchallenged most male
 interpretations of heterosexual relations. In calling rape "violence",
 feminists have enabled many men to distinguish what they have done
 from what rapists do, because they haven't caused external physical
 damage that they can understand as violence. If the victim has no
 bruises, broken bones, or other physical injuries, it is hard for men to
 "see" the violence. Complicating the picture further is that many rape
 victims have no internal injuries - as a matter of physiology, the
 muscles of the vagina may relax, and the vaginal walls are not torn or
 bruised. Second, the violence paradigm takes the focus away from the
 violence of unwanted intercourse itself; the stereotype takes on the
 characteristics of a brutal beating and the harm of penetration be-
 comes incidental. Finally, "violence" brings a certain image of the
 perpetrator as subhuman, evil, and dangerous; it fits the stereotype of
 the predatory psychopath as rapist, but fails to expand the stereotype.
 The image of the violent offender simply does not describe most men
 who rape.
 Feminists encounter difficulty describing the violence of forced
 intercourse as well. The excruciating and violent pain of forced pene-
 tration is invisible. As Ellen Scarry has pointed out, our language is
 inadequate to describing physical pain.79 Metaphors for the pain of
 forced penetration - stabbing, searing, tearing - do not really capture
 the body-shattering pain of forced intercourse. And as Scarry observes,
 we often resist attempting to understanding another's physical pain.80
 79 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World (New
 York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985).
 80 Id.
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 Women may therefore resist trying to understand the pain. Even if we
 had the language to speak the pain, men would be unable to under-
 stand the pain through physical empathy, because they do not have
 vaginas. The portrayal of pain for victims is also confounded by the
 fact that they may report no pain during the assault; they report "leav-
 ing their bodies", "blacking out", and other phenomena associated with
 human coping with extreme pain and extreme situations, although
 they may experience pain after the event.
 Another difficulty with the violence argument is that violence
 means physical "force". If "force" is considered part of intercourse by
 many writers - a proposition I find somewhat biased itself, as it is
 perfectly possible to have heterosexual penetration with virtually no
 noticeable "force" and certainly not pain - then forcible penetration
 alone is not violence and not rape. Indeed, "force" should not be a
 necessary requirement to transform heterosexual intercourse into rape,
 because it should go without saying that if a woman does not want to
 engage in intercourse and is not consenting, the man has to force her
 into the act.8' As MacKinnon notes, requiring both force and noncon-
 sent implies that "women consent to sex with force all the time....
 Given this sadomasochistic definition of sex at the line between inter-
 course and rape, it is no wonder that the legal concept of consent can
 coexist with a lot of force".8
 The radical feminist critique of rape has called into question more
 directly our vision of "sex" by insisting that rape is a crime of sex, not
 violence. For Catharine MacKinnon, the difficulty of defining the
 crime of rape is based on accepted sexual practices that privilege male
 physical aggression and violence. Noting that "the point of defining
 rape as violence not sex has been to claim an ungendered and non-
 sexual ground for affirming sex (heterosexuality) while rejecting vio-
 lence (rape)", she states, "The problem remains what it has always
 81 See J. H. Bogart, 'On the Nature of Rape', Pub. Affairs Q. 5 (1991): 117, for a
 philosophical argument that nonconsent, and not force, is the best way to under-
 stand rape and the moral harm rape causes.
 82 'Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law', supra note 62 at 1301.
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 been: telling the difference".83 According to MacKinnon, "the theme of
 the laws of sexual assault ... is male control of, access to, and use of
 women".84 This description of the laws would seem to comport with
 the male innocence/female guilt story, but her argument that violence
 is sex and sex is violent from the male point of view actually changes
 the story to male guilt and female innocence.
 MacKinnon is correct in arguing that we do need to examine our
 heterosexual practices and beliefs critically rather than unreflectively
 accepting the status quo as natural, given, and pleasurable, but her
 frequent conflation of heterosexuality and male violence and aggres-
 sion at times appears to deny the possibility of a distinction between
 the harm of sexual aggression and the pleasure of desired and wanted
 heterosexual activity. Along the way, her insistence on sex as violence
 encounters some of the difficulties that the rape is violence argument
 encounters: Men just don't see the violence.
 Recently, feminists active in the anti-rape movement have more
 directly challenged the myths of male innocence and female guilt in
 their campaign against "date rape", emphasizing that it is the man who
 rapes and who is responsible for what he does with his penis. These
 feminists have stressed that making the man responsible for what he
 does with his penis means that rape is sexual intercourse when the
 women's actual consent, her wishes, desires, and being, are irrelevant
 to the man's determination that she is consenting. Feminists have also
 attacked the self-serving belief that "no means yes", because it does not
 count the woman's wishes and affirms that women do not matter as
 persons in heterosexual relations, thereby relieving men of any respon-
 sibility towards determining women's interests. If "no means no", then
 when a woman manifests her wish that a man leave her alone and he
 ignores her, he is not a hero or seducer, but a rapist.
 The reactions to the argument that men are responsible for what
 they do with their penises and hence for rape are telling. Recently, for
 example, an opponent to a proposed change in Canadian law requiring
 83 Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, supra note 14 at 174.
 84 Id.
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 the man to take "'all reasonable steps'" to assure his partner was
 consenting condemned the requirement for interrupting "passion";
 other opponents argued it would render men victims of vindictive
 women.85 Time magazine in an article on acquaintance rape suggests
 that holding a man responsible for what he does with his penis is
 "extreme" and unromantic: "[i]t would be easy to accuse feminists of being
 too quick to classify sex as rape, but feminists are to befound on all sides of the
 debate, and many protest the idea that the onus is on the man",86 apparently
 because it "demeans women to suggest that they are so vulnerable to
 coercion or manipulation that they must always be escorted by the
 strong arm of the law". It also demeans women to be raped and to be
 disbelieved because we do not hold men responsible for what they do
 with their penises, but it is worth noticing how quickly the move is
 made away from male responsibility to focusing on female responsi-
 bility.
 The arguments against holding men responsible for their sexual
 conduct continue to include the sociobiological story that men will be
 aggressive to spread their genes, the story that holding men respon-
 sible would destroy "romance", and the old favorite, that any change
 in favor of women would encourage vindictive women to claim they
 were raped. An article by Neil Gilbert recently published in a con-
 servative journal that received wide coverage in the popular press
 makes many of these arguments as well as related ones. In an attack
 on several feminist scholars for allegedly distorting the statistics of
 rape rates in part because they employed a female-centered definition
 of rape rather than a male one; Gilbert singled out Mary Koss's study
 in particular for his scorn: Emphasizing over and over that the study
 was "sponsored by Ms. magazine" and neglecting to note that the study
 was funded by the NIMH, he discredits the study's findings beginning
 by accusing the researcher of deviating from the "legal" definition of
 85 John F. Burns, 'Canada Moves to Strengthen Sexual Assault Law', N.Y. Times,
 Feb. 21, 1992, p. YB9, col. 5.
 86 Sylvester Monroe, Priscilla Painton, & Anastasia Toufexis, 'When Is It Rape?',
 Time,June 3, 1991, 48, 53.
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 rape, "giving it a loose empirical interpretation".87 Vociferously object-
 ing to the "exten[sion] of the boundaries and transform[ation] of the
 character of what is to be considered sexual assault",88 what he really is
 objecting to is a female's interpretation of rape, rather than what
 "squares with human attitudes and experiences",89 also known as rape
 myths. He apparently accepts that a great deal of coercive behavior is
 "normal", rather than rape, unintentionally supporting MacKinnon's
 argument that what is normal is also abuse.
 Rushing to defend male innocence and privilege, Gilbert resorts to
 the "end of romance" argument: He argues that the "feminist prescrip-
 tion redefines conventional morality so as to give women complete
 control of physical intimacy between the sexes", which, in a leap of
 faith that would make Kierkegaard proud,90 means "[p]assion, spon-
 taneity, and the smile or nod that means assent are all ruled out of
 intimate discourse, to be replaced by rational calculation and formal
 understanding".9' "Under these definitions of rape and sexual coercion,
 the kaleidoscope of intimate discourse - passion, emotional turmoil,
 entreaties, flirtation, provocation, demureness - must give way to
 cool-headed contractual sex ....92 Apparently, "romance" and "pas-
 sion" are con games and misrepresentations. He even goes so far as to
 write approvingly of the male "you will like it" line, which I resented
 when it was used on me - I didn't like it, if I did I wouldn't be saying
 "stop it". In fact, "you know you like it" seems to reflect the projection
 of uncontrollable passion and lust onto women as in the male inno-
 cence/female guilt story.
 Gilbert also declares that one study "issues a radical feminist pre-
 scription for the empowerment of women that is noticeably uneasy
 87 Neil Gilbert, 'The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault', The Public Interest
 103 (1991): 54, 59.
 88 d. at 61.
 89 Id. at 59.
 90 I first heard this phrase when my friend Alan LaGod used it as an objection
 to a DA's argument when we were both working in the Santa Clara County
 Public Defender's office.
 91 Id.
 92 Id.at 60.
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 about physical intimacy between the sexes".93 If he means feminists are
 "noticeably uneasy" about forced intercourse, he is right; if he is using
 the rhetorical implication that feminists are anti-heterosexuality, he is
 engaging in name-calling without foundation. Clinging to Gilbert's
 story of heterosexuality is not a prescription for heterosexual pleasure
 or anything like it: It is a prescription for rape.
 Finally, in opposition to adopting a feminist approach to rape, there
 is the usual profession of concern that bewildered, innocent young
 men will be charged with rape by malicious, or, more charitably,
 confused females that accompanies all efforts to reform rape law. That
 there are false reports of rape is undeniable, but there are no more
 false reports of this crime than others - Alan Dershowitz's claim that
 the higher rate of "unfounding" of rape complaints means that there
 are more false allegations is itself false.4 Complaints are unfounded
 for a number of reasons that vary from police department to police
 department; falsity is one reason, but even then "false complaint" can
 mean either the police did not believe the complainant for a number
 of biased reasons, as Gary LaFree's study notes,95 or the complaint
 actually proves false. Ironically, the highest risk of wrongful conviction
 probably exists in the stereotypical stranger rape, because eyewitness
 identification evidence is likely to be erroneous, and sophisticated
 forensic testing to screen suspects has been expensive and rare.
 In the so-called "ambiguous" situation that so troubles opponents of
 rape reform, if both parties were genuinely ambivalent, it would seem
 highly unlikely that a woman will charge rape. The woman will not
 experience the fear, shame, and anger that go with being assaulted. In
 any event, uncertainty should mean stop, not go. It is a risk that is
 easily avoided, unless one believes men are entitled to sexual inter-
 course. As Robin Warshaw advises men, "If a woman says 'no' and
 really means 'yes, but you have to convince me', then you don't want
 9 d. at 61.
 94 Alan Dershowitz, "The PC cops won't tolerate a real debate", Colorado Daily,
 Oct. 9, 1991, p. 10, col 1.
 93 Rape and CriminalJustice, supra note 5, at 69, 76-78; see note 6, supra.
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 to be with her anyway. She's playing a game and it's a game nobody
 wins. Forget about 'losing an opportunity'. Just walk away".96
 The unwillingness to abandon the male innocence/female guilt
 story certainly gives some credibility to MacKinnon's argument that
 the law supports the sexual use and abuse of women. Yet the anti-sex,
 anti-romance arguments are difficult for feminists to overcome in a
 culture heavily invested in heterosexuality. Because much of the
 feminist effort to eliminate rape does rest on a vision of heterosexu-
 ality that is undeveloped, feminists do find that making the distinction
 between rape and heterosexual intercourse is difficult. That is, we have
 not yet developed a positive explanation or account of heterosexuality,
 making the feminist critique of rape law vulnerable to the "slippery
 slope" argument that we see all heterosexuality as rape. This conclu-
 sion is not surprising in a way, given the desperate need for critique of
 heterosexual practices and the lack of knowledge about female sexu-
 ality in a world where research is still focused on the penis and on
 penetration as "sex". But without a "positive" account of heterosexu-
 ality, feminism has difficulty maintaining a distinction between rape
 and intercourse, between a profoundly damaging experience and an
 immensely pleasurable one.
 McKinnon asks, "Instead of asking what is the violation of rape ...
 what is the non-violation of intercourse? .... Perhaps the wrong of
 rape has proved to be so difficult to define because the unquestionable
 starting point has been that rape is defined as distinct from inter-
 course, while for women it is difficult to distinguish the two under
 conditions of male dominance".97 MacKinnon's assertion that women
 cannot distinguish the two is a negation of women's ability to know
 the difference among rape, "bad sex", and heterosexual pleasure, which
 undermines her claim that she is using women's experience as the
 ground for her argument. It also alienates women who would be
 sympathetic to a critique of heterosexual practices and beliefs that
 perpetuate rape. While it is impossible to have heterosexual inter-
 96 Robin Warshaw, I Never Called It Rape (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), p.
 164.
 97 Towards a Feminist Theory of the State, supra note 14, at 174.
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 course in the United States (or, undoubtedly, anywhere else) without
 doing so within a cultural context of "compulsory heterosexuality",
 male dominance, and oppression of females, this is not the same as
 saying that all heterosexual intercourse takes place in a cultural con-
 text of male violence and exploitation and female dysphoria. By listen-
 ing to women's account of their experience and reading the writings
 of feminists,98 we can begin to develop a description and an analysis of
 the differences among rape, "bad sex", and "good sex". And as we do
 so, we may also begin a story of heterosexuality to replace the male
 innocence/female guilt story.
 An obvious point is that heterosexual women do not necessarily feel
 harmed by heterosexual penetration; they do not experience all inter-
 course as the kind of soul-murder that constitutes rape. They may
 look forward to, desire, and want heterosexual intimacy. On the other
 hand, many women also know that when they were forced to have
 intercourse by a man who is bigger and stronger and didn't care about
 their wishes, that they were raped, even if they do not think anyone
 would believe them; they feel fear and degradation at the time and
 fear, shame, anger, self-blame, vulnerability, and grief afterwards.
 Others may or may not call something scary and unwanted "rape". In
 both instances, women are likely to believe that they are to blame for
 what occurred, thus accepting the male innocence/female guilt story,
 although they might be skeptical of claims to male innocence. These
 women are likely to understand that they were sexually abused, that
 these experiences were not pleasurable, but painful.
 Somewhere in between rape and "bad sex" are the experiences of
 those women who, as Robin West has pointed out, transform a poten-
 tially threatening and scary sexual encounter into "consensual" sex by
 becoming "giving selves" who then "consent" to sex.99 "[F]or a woman
 98 Robin West has suggested that Adrienne Rich's explorations of the positive in
 motherhood within the context of oppression is analogous to an effort to give a
 positive account of heterosexuality, for example.
 '9 West, 'The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological
 Critique of Liberal and Radical Legal Feminism, Wisc. Women's LJ. 3 (1987): 81,
 101-06.
 164
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Fri, 27 May 2016 13:56:35 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Rape and Responsibility
 or girl who has defined herself as 'giving' and her sexuality as 'that
 which is to be given', there is no line [between the feeling of force and
 the 'sheer inevitability of sex']." The woman "will never experience the
 anxious, ambiguous fear of rape by a 'date'. But nor will she experience
 the consensual sex as pleasurable, or if she does, it will be only inci-
 dental".'00 These women have "preempted" being raped by consenting,
 but they know that whatever the encounter was or is, it was or is
 invasive, not sexually pleasurable, and left or leaves them frightened,
 upset, and feeling guilt and shame. It is this situation where "telling
 the difference" between heterosexual intercourse and rape may be
 difficult, but the woman is unlikely to believe she was raped.
 Contrary to MacKinnon's assertion, women also can tell the differ-
 ence between rape and "bad sex". Many women have had heterosexual
 intercourse with little pleasure, but without feeling frightened or
 coerced at the time or dirty, shamed, or in pain afterwards. I use the
 common phrase "bad sex" to capture this realm of experience which
 needs to be understood in the context of beliefs about women, rape,
 and heterosexuality.101 The phrase "bad sex" covers a range of hetero-
 sexual interactions for women: their partner was clumsy; their mood
 or their partner's mood affected the interaction; they lost their desire
 but felt they should let the man continue to orgasm, either because
 they believed things were "too far along" to stop and they wanted to
 100 Id. at 103.
 101 I am indebted to Martha Mahoney for helping me in trying to describe what
 might constitute "bad sex". To my knowledge, the term "bad sex" is part of
 common, not academic, parlance. I have heard the phrase used by heterosexuals,
 gays, and lesbians to describe unsatisfying sexual encounters. It is often used to
 mock victims of rape, as in "She's just complaining about 'bad sex'," as well as to
 capture a multitude of sexual situations and experiences. Martha Mahoney has
 reminded me that the West-Posner debate contains the phrase, but their discus-
 sion uses it to describe what I would consider situations that more properly fall
 within the "giving self" problem. See Robin West, "Authority, Autonomy, and
 Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka
 and Richard Posner," Harv. L. Rev. 99 (1985): 384, 398-99; Richard Posner, "The
 Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor West," Harv. L. Rev. 99
 (1986): 1444.
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 avoid a hassle or because they cared about the man; and so on. The
 movie "Annie Hall" contains a scene, which prompted much knowing
 female laughter in the theater when I saw it, in which Diane Keaton
 "leaves" her body and sits on the edge of the bed while Woody Allen
 carries on. I do not think there would have been that kind of warm
 laughter if we thought he was raping or frightening her. Women -
 and men - have sexual relations that they later regret. Nevertheless, in
 "bad sex", women do not feel raped, if for no other reason than they
 are exercising some agency.
 In contrast, women in the United States'02 may feel heterosexual
 desire and want to act upon it; many women have had at least a
 glimpse of "good sex" and have liked it. The experience of "good sex"
 is not radically severed from cultural definitions and stories, of course,
 but it is situated in individual bodies, sensations, and psyches. Women
 do report having had heterosexual intercourse that is mutually delight-
 ful, fun, passionate, rowdy, sweaty, lusty, humorous, gentle, orgasmic,
 crazy, or a combination of these things, about which they feel good.
 Although with the abandonment of the myth of the "vaginal orgasm",
 we can recognize that penetration is not important for sexual pleasure
 for many women, this does not necessarily mean it is not at least part
 of a pleasurable sexual exchange or that women do not experience
 pleasure in the connection. In an atmosphere of trust and desire,
 heterosexual activity, including intercourse, is a source of great pleas-
 ure for some - many? - women. It is an experience of intense
 intimacy, not invasion; intimacy and connection can be a powerfully
 pleasurable and wondrous experience. Nor does women's sexual pleas-
 ure require absolute equality of power and status; pleasure undoubt-
 edly can take place along multiple sites of relationship, status, and
 action.
 102 Recently, I saw several newspaper articles concerning a kind of "Kinsey
 report" done in the People's Republic of China. Apparently, the survey found
 that few Chinese couples engage in "foreplay" and penetration occurs rapidly.
 This approach to heterosexual intercourse might make most intercourse painful
 for women in China and closer to the rape experience than is the case for
 women in much of American society, where information on, and concern with,
 "satisfying" one's partner is a large part of culture.
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 In another effort to develop a positive story of female heterosexu-
 ality in contrast to MacKinnon, Dru Cornell draws on the work of
 French feminists and philosophers. Cornell is concerned to uncover,
 develop, and affirm the value of "the Feminine", including its value in
 heterosexuality. Rejecting a model of male blame and female inno-
 cence, Cornell accepts that male dominance, "compulsory heterosexu-
 ality", and male aggression and violence exist, but fights MacKinnon's
 characterization of "the feminine self" as "that which is fucked".'03
 According to Cornell, if the subject/person seeks intimacy and con-
 nection with another - a "feminine" value - rather than "freedom"
 from others - a "masculine" value - in sex, then sex is not the
 oppressive experience of "being fucked". MacKinnon does not "suc-
 cessfully distinguish the inherent value, ability and risk the self
 involved in eroticism from the specific feminine position of 'being
 fucked' ... she cannot as long as she re-casts the subject as seeking
 freedom, not intimacy, in sex".'04 For Cornell, the feminine subject
 seeks intimacy and resists the masculine definition of subject, in which
 "the body becomes the barrier in which the self hides, and the weapon
 - the phallus - asserts itself against others".105
 Cornell argues that only if one adopts the masculine definition of
 "self" does one find "being fucked" terrifying.106 "The feminine self
 celebrated in myth and allegory lives in the body differently. The body
 is not an erected barrier, but a position of receptivity. ... To shut
 oneself off is loss of sexual pleasure .... The endless erection of a
 barrier against 'being fucked' is seen for what it 'is' - a defense
 mechanism that creates a fort for the self at the expense of jouissance",
 or female sexual pleasure in its multiplicity.107 The alternative to
 celibacy for heterosexual women is to reject the "empty victory of
 never being penetrated in the name of a self that seeks to be selbst-
 103 Drucilla Cornell, 'Myth, Allegory, and the Feminine', Cornell L. Rev. 75




 107 Id.at691 &n. 118.
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 staendig" or unconnected in a masculine way,108 and to claim feminine
 sexuality as a "positive" force in the world. That no one appears to
 know how to describe this force yet does not mean that it does not
 exist and is not there to be said.109
 Another suggestion for distinguishing between rape and heterosexu-
 ality is Lois Pineau's argument for "communicative" rather than "con-
 tractual" sexuality. "Contractual" sexuality assumes that force in sex is
 consented to absent a "vigorous act of refusal". She suggests an alterna-
 tive of looking at sexual interaction "as if it were a proper conversa-
 tion rather than an offer from the Mafia","1 using friendship as a
 model. In a conversation between friends, people care about and try to
 communicate with each other. If they do not understand each other,
 they try to clarify the meaning of what they are saying. Ideally, Pineau
 writes, sexuality would be a conversation, an interaction like friend-
 ship, with interpersonal consideration and "sympathy" or empathy for
 the other in a context of sharing pleasure and fostering the desire of
 the other.
 A positive account of female sexuality and female heterosexuality
 might also provide us a story that contradicts the story of male
 innocence and female guilt that dominates the interpretation of rape,
 although it is also deeply threatening to existing structures of thought.
 There is a real risk that by admitting women are sexual and have
 desire, we will realize the fear that Rousseau manifested; fears of the
 devouring or engulfing vagina, with insatiable passions and sexual
 dangerousness projected onto every woman, would undoubtedly lead
 to more, not less, emphasis on the male innocence/female guilt story.
 Challenging the religious story of male innocence and female guilt
 will be a difficult task as well. But the alternative is worse, to leave the
 definition and control of heterosexual practice to men and to deny
 women an equal part in shaping that practice and defining the stories
 we tell.
 108 Id.at693 & n. 123.
 09 Id. at 693.
 10 'Date Rape', supra note 77, at 235.
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 VI. TAKING RAPE SERIOUSLY
 It is undeniably true that although millions of women and girls in the
 United States have been raped by men, millions of men are not in
 prison for having raped them. It is also true that it may be virtually
 unthinkable that we realistically can achieve further reform in the law
 of rape. Nevertheless, it is still worth asking what would happen were
 we to abandon the presumption of male innocence and female guilt
 and began to treat men accused of rape the same way we treat others
 accused of felonies. What if there were a "rupture in the discourse" of
 heterosexuality in the law of rape,111 so that men were not assumed to
 be innocent and women guilty in sexual encounters, so that women
 would not be presumed to be consenting because of their "nature",
 and so that women's voices were equally as authoritative as men's?
 The cliche that "stateways don't entirely change folkways" does not
 excuse the continuing failure to hold men accountable for rape. While
 radically changing the definition of a crime does not alone end
 criminal behavior, occasionally law reform can help shift or lead the
 way in affecting attitudes and behaviors. Although the campaign
 against drink driving could be characterized in a number of ways, for
 example, law reform has helped change attitudes and behaviors by
 changing drunk driving from a morally trivial to a morally serious
 offense. The law now treats some deaths caused by a drunk driver as
 murder, the most blameworthy form of homicide. Although murder
 prosecutions appear to be rare in these cases, the legal change and
 accompanying messages about the seriousness of the conduct may have
 led to less drinking and driving by social, non-alcoholic, drinkers.
 Another possible example of changing behavior through law-like
 processes is the recent effort by universities and colleges to take sexual
 abuse of female undergraduates by male undergraduates seriously;
 while there has been considerable conflict over what circumstances
 merit discipline and whether universities should discipline their male
 students for sexual abuse at all, administrative awareness of and sensi-
 11 I thank Robert Weisberg for this nice formulation of the question I wish to
 ask.
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 tivity to the problem of acquaintance rape among undergraduates has
 probably improved considerably in the past few years. At least some
 students themselves may perhaps be more receptive to the feminist
 arguments that "no means no" and that women are not at fault if they
 are raped. The same might occur if criminal law and practice sent the
 clear message that we as a society take rape very seriously. If the law
 of rape held men responsible for their actions by explicitly rejecting
 the story of male innocence and female guilt, it might help us in the
 larger project of redefining cultural stories of heterosexuality and
 heterosexual behavior.
 Existing reforms in the law of rape undoubtedly have helped in
 prosecuting and punishing stereotypical rapists in many jurisdictions.
 Whether there has been any corresponding deterrent effect - general
 or specific - on men who fit the stereotype is debatable, as male
 innocence and female guilt can still lead to acquittals in stranger rape
 cases such as the one in Florida in which the jury decided that the
 victim was asking for it because she was not wearing underwear.'"2
 Although rape can be motivated by hatred, anger, or the wish to
 exercise power and control over a woman,"3 if men know that they
 will be held responsible for their actions, some may very well reject
 rape and sexual abuse as a behavioral option. Moreover, further reform
 in the law that would enable prosecutors successfully to prosecute
 acquaintance rape/"consent defense" cases could have a substantial
 deterrent effect on those rapists.
 At one level, at least, the crime of rape in the acquaintance and date
 contexts would appear to be one of the most deterrable felonies. A
 study found that 30 percent of college men surveyed said they would
 rape if they thought they could get away with it and 50 percent said
 they would force sex on a woman if they could get away with it.14
 112 See note 8, supra.
 113 Nicholas Groth, Men Who Rape (New York: Plenum Publishers, 1979)
 (clinical study of convicted rapists), pp. 13-44.
 114 See, e.g., Neil Malamuth, 'Rape Proclivity Among Males', J. Soc. Issues 37
 (1981): 138; 'When Will We Be Believed?', supra note 43, at 1021-25; 'Reflec-
 tions on Sex Equality Under Law', supra note 62, at 1302 n. 106.
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 This suggests that making it clear they couldn't get away with it
 (because women would not automatically be blamed for provoking
 men) could perhaps deter a number of these men. The most deterrable
 group would undoubtedly be middle and upper middle class men of
 all colors; they would have the most to lose if convicted of rape."5
 Another reason to have some confidence about deterrence is that rape
 is an easily avoided offense: As Mark Kelman has observed, "By
 avoiding sexual intercourse with women who are not clearly con-
 senting, the defendant can avoid criminality". 16
 If we were successful in getting the culture to reject the story of
 male innocence and female guilt in heterosexual relations, at least in
 the law of rape, it could have a positive effect on heterosexuality as
 practiced in this country. The story of male innocence and female
 guilt supports heterosexual practices that encourage lack of responsi-
 bility and communication between men and women. It is only a guess,
 but I would think that both men and women find heterosexual
 relations far more pleasurable, enjoyable, and fun when both are
 interested, willing, and communicating with one another. Exploration
 of each other's pleasure and desire in a context of empathy, commu-
 nication, and care would seem far more positive than using a warm
 body for a mechanical act: As a male friend of mine said a long time
 ago, "friction is friction", and if that's all you want, you can do it
 without anyone else. There might be more play, more jouissance, less
 focus on intercourse and more on the multiplicities of eroticism if we
 made it clear that you have to consider the other person as a human
 being with wishes and desires.
 Taking rape seriously might also provide incentives for hetero-
 sexuals to take more responsibility in communicating with each other.
 At a minimum, men would have to be sure that their partners desired
 15 Middle and upper middle class women may be more likely to report rapes,
 because they are more likely to feel comfortable dealing with legal authorities
 generally, but these victims are also likely to be pressured into not reporting an
 assault, because the stakes for men of their class are so high.
 116 Mark Kelman, 'Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law',
 Stan.L.Rev. 33: 591, 626, n. 94.
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 or agreed to heterosexual intercourse with them. Rather than con-
 sidering sexual intercourse their due, men would have to interpret
 ambivalent or negative signals as unwillingness or confusion that
 requires clarification, not permission to continue with their actions. At
 the same time, women would be given some ability to define their
 sexuality clearly in a way that respects their professed wishes. As things
 stand now, it makes little difference to say no if the man can ignore
 the "no" or frighten the woman into rescinding her "no". If women
 are heard, however, those who mean no will have their wishes
 honored and those who mean yes will have to say "yes".
 During the transition from current practice to one in which men
 did take responsibility for their sexuality, it is quite possible that men
 would use withdrawal of sex as a "weapon" against women much in
 the same way that some men have resisted and complained about
 women's increased sexual assertiveness. In fact, when I have talked to
 students about rape, some men complain that they might as well not
 engage in sexual activity with women at all. But it also might lead to a
 rewriting of the story of heterosexuality to be a story of communica-
 tion, responsibility, and care, rather than one of innocence and guilt.
 If we actually took the crime of rape seriously and enforced the
 law, given the current prevalence of rape, a considerable percentage of
 the male population would be in prison. This is one of the most
 dangerous threats of the feminist critique of the criminal law of rape
 and it may make it virtually impossible to move away from the
 attachment to stereotypes, male innocence, and concern with "wrong-
 ful convictions". Thus, a radical revision of rape law will probably
 encounter serious resistance. If the law and actors in the criminal
 justice system were to abandon the male innocence/female guilt story,
 a number of obstacles to increasing convictions for crime of rape
 beyond the stranger-in-the-bushes or violent acquaintance and marital
 rape scenarios would remain. As with earlier reforms, one would
 expect a slight increase in awareness, reporting, and successful pro-
 secution. Particularly if feminists do not have an alternative and
 positive story of heterosexuality to replace the existing one, entrenched
 models of heterosexuality, which involve beliefs that men are the
 initiators or aggressors, women the coy or passive recipients in sex,
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 that "seduction" is romantic and desirable, and that the men are
 innocent and women are guilty could lead to a kind of backlash
 against enforcement of an enlightened rape law. Reform also could
 lead to a co-optation of the law by the moral Right, a fear held by
 British, if not American, feminists.'17 State control of sexuality is
 always problematic, and to the extent that there is an opportunity to
 punish those who deviate from contexts in which sex is "approved",
 a rigid morality might flourish. For example, Pineau's "reasonable
 woman" standard for consent might be co-opted into a deeply con-
 servative standard that no reasonable woman would consent to sex
 outside of marriage, or go with a man to his hotel room, or drink
 with a man in a bar, or whatever.
 At least in the short term, an expanded understanding of rape could
 lead to jury nullification and a diminution in the seriousness of the
 offense. If feminists fail successfully to challenge the story of male
 innocence and female guilt in the larger culture, problems of nullifica-
 tion and pressures to reduce sentences are, perhaps, inevitable. Al-
 though it is true that men convicted of rape can receive very light
 sentences, including probation, in some jurisdictions,ll8 with the crime
 control/retaliatory retributivist vogue of the last decades and manda-
 tory sentencing laws, a felony conviction for rape can mean fairly long
 mandatory prison terms in many jurisdictions.119 Taking rape seriously
 might mean that large numbers of men would be sentenced to terms
 in prisons that are already unconscionably overcrowded aid brutal.
 Nor are local jails any better. Conviction of a felony in many states
 can mean a loss of the right to vote, required registration as a "sex
 offender", and other bad things. Further, the image of criminals in this
 society is that of Other; the image of criminal is one of poor men of
 117 See, e.g., Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (New York: Routedge
 Chapman & Hall, 1988).
 118 For example, although the press in the Tyson case emphasized the theoretical
 maximum sentence of 60 years for conviction of rape and two counts of criminal
 deviate conduct, Tyson was also eligible for probation as a first time adult
 offender.
 119 In California, for example, conviction for rape means mandatory state prison.
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 color or white trash, not "our" sons. Because many men who rape do
 not fit the image of "criminal" that evokes the kind of visceral moral
 response that justifies our willingness to imprison people in this
 culture, juries might continue to refuse to convict middle and upper
 middle class men who don't meet the cultural stereotype of nasty
 felons and psychopathic rapists.
 Pressure to punish rape less severely than it is punished now would
 probably rise. Crime control advocates and those who would minimize
 the harm of rape, because it is confused with "sex", might very well be
 sympathetic to arguments that rape defined as a crime against women
 is not such a heinous offense after all. For example, Time magazine
 suggests that it is "unreasonable" to consider that "date rape" is as
 serious an offense as "real rape", because "there may be very murky
 issues of intent and degree [sic] involved".'20 Further, fairly respectable
 arguments suggesting that any rape should not carry heavy penalties
 already are available to opponents of serious penalties for rape:
 Michael Davis has argued in the pages of this journal that rape is no
 more serious or culpable than battery and therefore should be treated
 the same as battery for the purposes of both defining the crime and
 determining punishments.'2' The moral retributivist concepts of "just
 deserts" and proportionality comport with lesser penalties, because
 rape is not such a serious evil as all that. Demonstrating the lack of
 male understanding of rape created by the violence argument I noted
 earlier, Davis asserts that "simple rape does not differ much in fearful-
 ness from simple battery and is certainly less fearful than aggravated
 battery".'22
 In developing his argument against serious penalties for rape, Davis
 ignores the terror of rape victims when he poses the question, Which
 would you choose, being compelled by brute force to have sexual
 intercourse or being badly beaten without permanent harm? The
 question seems to assume that rape is not painful, that forcible inter-
 120 Sylvester Monroe, Priscilla Painton, & Anastasia Toufexis, "When is it Rape?"
 supra note 86 at 54.
 121 Davis, 'What Does Rape Deserve?', L. &Phil. 3 (1984): 61, 88-101.
 122 Id.at95.
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 course is not violent, and that the rape victim does not fear for her life
 in the way a beating victim does. Indeed, he asserts that most women
 would prefer "simple rape" to "battery with one aggravating factor".
 Empirically, this claim strikes me as false; evidence suggests that
 "simple" rape does as much harm to the victim as does the kind of
 aggravated assault that threatens its victim's life; victims of both crimes
 suffer the effects of what I have elsewhere referred to as "extreme
 trauma".123 Davis also claims that "it is not true that aggravated rape is
 clearly worse than aggravated battery".'24 But while it is true that
 victims of aggravated assaults face many of the same issues as rape
 victims, they do not have anyone telling them they ought to have
 enjoyed it or expecting them to enjoy what often feels like a replaying
 of the experience. Nor does aggravated assault create fear of half the
 population in many of its victims.
 Davis is undoubtedly correct in another part of his argument, how-
 ever: given the severity of the punishment for rape, "juries have
 trouble convicting rapists .... How can this be that crime?"'25
 Further, because most rapists are "quite ordinary, not at all what you
 would expect a class-X felon-sex fiend to be .... How can he deserve
 this penalty?" There are, of course, several assumptions operating here,
 one that rape is not a crime, and the other that only sexual psycho-
 paths commit rape. But Davis, rather than seeking to rebut the myths,
 concludes that by redefining rape to be battery, punishments would be
 less severe but more certain. This argument is appropriate if one is
 arguing for deterrence and not for proportionality in rape sentencing,
 but his argument is one supposedly based on moral retributivist and
 not deterrent principles.
 Feminists are caught in a bind between the arguments for retribu-
 tive punishment and deterrence of the crime of rape. Because all rape
 is a form of soul murder, a life-threatening and life-damaging experi-
 ence, proportionality would seem to demand heavy penalties. Recently,
 activists criticized the United States Sentencing Commission's base
 123 Henderson, 'The Wrongs of Victim's Rights', Stan. L. Rev. 37 (1985): 934.
 124 'What Does Rape Deserve?', supra note 121, at 95.
 125 Id.at 108.
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 term of five to six years for rape as being "too low" and dispropor-
 tionate to the severity of the offense of "simple rape". In response, the
 proposed federal Violence Against Women Act directs the Commis-
 sion to raise the base terms for sexual assault.126 Practically, however, a
 patriarchal society will not tolerate imposition of heavy penalties on
 large numbers of men for raping women, at least in the short term.
 Because punishment is always a balance among concerns of retribu-
 tion, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation, the question is one
 of balancing the need to deter rape against the need not to devalue its
 harm to women. To the extent certainty, and not severity, of punish-
 ment is the most effective deterrent, feminists might have to accept a
 shorter, and not a longer, base term than proportionality suggests.
 A possible "compromise" would be to continue to use the formula
 of mitigated, middle, and aggravated term sentencing similar to that
 used in most determinate sentencing laws governing sexual assault.
 Aggravated terms would apply when the man used a weapon, caused
 the victim additional great bodily injury, attacked her by surprise, and
 other factors most commonly associated with stranger-in-the-bushes
 rape but also present in many marital and acquaintance rapes. The
 middle term would apply to most rapes where some additional physi-
 cal violence or threats of physical or economic harm occurred. The
 mitigated term would apply to those rapes in which the man did not
 have consent and went ahead anyway. To preserve proportionality, the
 mitigated term should require some level of imprisonment. Although I
 am aware that there are problems with this suggestion, because it
 seems to denigrate the harm of rape independent of other "violence", I
 am concerned to avoid nullification and increase deterrence if at all
 possible. I believe the practical difficulties of relying solely on moral
 retributivist arguments for punishment, particularly within a cultural
 context that reinforces beliefs that men are not morally responsible for
 their sexual actions, also argue in favor of focusing on certainty and
 not severity at this time.
 126 Violence Against Women Act of 1990, Tit. I, Subtit. A, Secs. 112(a) & (b);
 Violence Against Women Act of 1991, S. 15, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Sec. 112(a) &
 (b).
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 Finally, and worth noting, feminists often appear to assume that if
 the law of rape were not so biased against victims, more women
 would prosecute their rapists. But if general attitudes to sex and rape
 do not change significantly, women will still be reluctant to report
 rapes or to prosecute rapists. If men are innocent and women guilty in
 heterosexuality, then women who are raped will remain silent and
 ashamed. Women will not want to be blamed by their families,
 friends, and communities for having asked for it, for being vengeful,
 or for being promiscuous. They may be too frightened or too isolated
 to want to prosecute. Cultural, psychological, economic, and other
 factors affecting their lives may lead victims to remain silent, or at
 least unwilling to go through the criminal process; they also may be
 pressured by others not to prosecute. Women of color are still caught
 between the pressures to protect their communities against racism and
 the need to stop sexual violence within those communities. It still
 takes enormous courage to speak the word rape, endure the criticism
 and anger directed at one, and pursue a prosecution.
 Even if being a victim of rape did not have negative social conse-
 quences, reporting and aiding the prosecution of a crime is unpleasant
 in the best of circumstances. We should not and cannot force women
 to prosecute, although we can encourage women to speak, thank the
 women who courageously do prosecute, and do everything in our
 power to support women who are raped. We can work to educate
 men and women to understand that rape is a crime, not a harmless
 frolic or bad sex. Finally, we must continue our efforts to make the
 experience less traumatic by working to eliminate the male innocence
 and female guilt story in law and society.
 VII. CONCLUSION
 This article has argued that a story of male innocence and female guilt
 permeates this culture's understanding and interpretation of hetero-
 sexuality as well as the law of rape. The story of male innocence and
 female guilt is, of course, not the sole explanation for rape. Rape exists
 within a culture that tolerates a good deal of violence against women
 - and violence generally - together with violent pornography. Gender
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 inequality and misogyny exist in every class and race. All of these
 factors contribute to and interact with rape, as do more "benign"
 habits and practices that diminish women and privilege men. Never-
 theless, the male innocence/female guilt story has had considerable
 power and effect on the interpretation of sexual assault. I have argued
 that the story significantly undermines feminist attempts to use criminal
 law to punish rape, and it enables rape to flourish by providing a
 cultural and moral excuse for male sexual behavior.
 That we live in a culture that tolerates a high rate of sexual
 violence against its female members is morally deplorable; we must
 hold those men who sexually abuse women morally and legally
 responsible for their conduct. Starting to take rape seriously and to
 hold those who rape responsible for their actions may begin with law,
 but it does not end there. If men did stop blaming women for rape
 and took responsibility for ending rape, and if both men and women
 took responsibility for their sexuality, we might reach a time when
 this particular "never again" is almost a reality. To paraphrase Camus,
 we may not be able to prevent all rape, but we certainly can reduce
 the number of rapes.
 School of Law,
 Indiana University,
 Bloomington, IN 47405,
 U.S.A.
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